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ONE SHARE, ONE VOTE: THE SEC'S DUTY TO
PROTECT INVESTORS AND ENSURE FAIR
ADMINISTRATION AMONG THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGES
Since 1926, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has prohibited
registered companies of the NYSE from creating a class of common stock
that gives shareholders more than one vote per share of common stock.'
Neither the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) nor the National Association
of Securities Dealers (NASD), the two national securities exchanges with
which the NYSE competes, has a similar prohibition respecting voting
provisions for common stock. 2 Recently, several registered companies of the

1. See NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LsTED COMPANY MANUAL § 313.00 (1983)
[hereinafter NYSE MANUAL] (since 1926 New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has refused to
allow registered companies to list nonvoting or disparate voting common stock). The NYSE
listing manual specifically states that the exchange may refuse to list on the exchange any
corporation that issues a class or series of common stock that has unusual voting provisions.
Id. § 313.00(C). The NYSE defines the term "unusual voting provisions" as provisions that
tend to nullify or restrict shareholder voting. Id. The NYSE offers as an example of unusual
voting common stock a class of stock that has the power to veto the actions of the other
common stock shareholders. Id. The NYSE reasons that when management divides voting
power between the common stock and one or more other classes or series of stock under
normal conditions, the NYSE will consider the proportion of the total voting power represented
by the other classes or series of stock to their relative equities in the company. Id. § 313.00(D);
see Karmel, Is One Share, One Vote Archaic?, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 26, 1985, at 2, coL. 3 (discussing
developments leading to disparate voting stock). In Is One Share, One Vote Archaic Ms.
Karmel attributes the rising corporate interest in disparate voting stock to hostile tender offers,
the institutionalization of public securities markets, the extensive disclosure requirements
respecting proxy statements, increased sophistication of investors, and the NYSE's competition
with the other securities exchanges for corporations to trade their securities on the NYSE. Id.
See generally Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the
Rule of "One Share, One Vote", 56 CORNELL L. RFV. 1 (1970) (relating historical evaluation
of growth of one share, one vote rule); Rohrlich, Corporate Voting Majority Control, 7 ST.
JoHN's L. REv. 218 (evaluating 1920's trend away from one share, one vote rule).
2. See J. Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common
Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. VAsH. L. REV. 687, 691-92 (1986) (discussing American
Stock Exchange (AMEX) and National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) restrictions
on common stock voting rights); see also AsmEucAN STOCK EXCHANGE, CouPANY GUIDE §§
101-17 (1983) [hereinafter AMEX GumE], reprinted in 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide §§ 10,001-17
(CCH) (1983) (AMEX standards for listing corporate securities are similar to NYSE, but less
rigorous). Professor Seligman in Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One
Common Share, One Vote Controversy claims that the AMEX rule governing common stock
voting rights is minimal compared to that of the NYSE. Seligman, supra, at 691. The AMEX
Guide states that the AMEX will disapprove an application for the listing of a nonvoting
common stock, but that the exchange may approve the listing of a common stock that has
the right to elect only a minority of the board of directors. AMEX Guide § 122, reprintedin
2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) § 10,022, at 3525 (1985).
Professor Seligman in his article explains that the NASD currently has no restrictions
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NYSE have requested the NYSE to allow them to create a class of common
stock that has more than one vote per share. 3 The NYSE directors fear that
unless they adopt a less stringent requirement concerning common stock
voting provisions, or unless the SEC requires the AMEX and the NASD to
adopt similar restrictions, numerous NYSE registered companies will transfer
their memberships from the NYSE either to the AMEX or to the NASD
to take advantage of the less restrictive voting provisions of the AMEX and
the NASD. 4
To prevent the NYSE registered companies from transferring to the
AMEX and the NASD, the NYSE has proposed to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) that the SEC allow the NYSE to abandon the
one share, one vote rule.' Currently, the exchanges and the major institu-

regarding the voting rights of common stock that its registered companies issue. Seligman,
supra, at 692; see Karmel, The SEC's Power to Regulate Stockholder Voting Rights, N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 21, 1986, at 2, col. 2 (noting that NASD, which maintains NASDAQ trading system,
has no requirements regarding common stock voting rights). In July of 1985, however, the
NASD submitted to the SEC for comment two alternative proposals for shareholder voting
rights. Seligman, supra, at 692. The first proposal would require NASD registered companies
to adhere to the one share, one vote system, but would permit any existing issues of disparate
voting common stock to continue to exist under a grandfather provision. Id. The second
proposal would require the NASD registered companies to adhere to the one share, one vote
rule unless the shareholders of a two-thirds majority of the outstanding shares of common
stock approved the disparate voting stock. Id. However, the second proposal would place a
ceiling on the ratio in voting rights of ten to one. Id. The NASD, nevertheless, failed to adopt
either of the two proposals. Id.
3. See Brandow, The NYSE's One Share/One Vote Rule, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 9, 1985, at
33, col. 2 (evaluating NYSE reasons that registered companies are seeking dual class capitalization). In The NYSE's One Share/One Vote Rule Brandow points to the Figgie International
and A. 0. Smith companies, which left the NYSE in 1983 because of the creation of new
classes of common stock having unequal voting rights, as indicative of the trend of NYSE
registered companies to delist from the NYSE. Id. at 47 n.2, col. 4. Since early 1984, the
General Motors Corporation, Dow Jones & Company, and the Coastal Corporation have
issued common stock with disparate voting rights. SEC Request for Additional Comments and
Announcement of Hearingsfor NYSE Dual Voting Rights Proposal, [July-Dec.] SEc. R G. &
L. REP. (BNA) 1697, 1697 n.6 (Nov. 21, 1986) [hereinafter SEC Request]. Professor Karmel
states in The SEC's Power to Regulate Stockholder Voting Rights that the threat that registered
companies listed on the NYSE will depart from the exchange impairs the NYSE's ability to
maintain the one share, one vote rule. Karmel, supra note 2, at 2, col. 2. Brandow in his
article notes that the managements of many NYSE registered companies have concluded that
their companies could thwart any hostile tender offers by issuing disparate voting common
stock. Brandow, supra, at 33, col. 3.
4. See Public Hearings on New York Stock Exchange's Proposal Amending "One
Share, One Vote" Rule (Dec. 16-17, 1986) 4-485 [hereinafter NYSE Proposal Hearings]
(transcript available at Bechtel Information Services in Washington, D.C.). In testifying, before
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the CEO of the NYSE claimed that although
the NYSE supports the spirit of the one share, one vote rule, the NYSE cannot stand alone
in the securities marketplace in applying the rule. Id. at 11; see supra note 3 (discussing
companies registered with NYSE that have issued disparate voting stock).
5. See SEC Request, supra note 3, at 1697 (SEC announcement of NYSE's proposal
to abandon one share, one vote rule). Section 19(b) of the '34 Act requires all securities
exchanges to file with the SEC copies of any proposed rule or proposed rule change to the
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tional and individual investors are speculating on whether the SEC will or
should accept the NYSE's proposal to abandon the one share, one vote
rule. 6 The possibility of the SEC requiring, as an alternative to approving
the NYSE proposal, all the exchanges to maintain the one share, one vote
rule has intensified the exchanges' concern over the proposal.7 As the SEC
considers whether to approve or to disapprove the NYSE proposal and even
after the SEC takes action, the fundamental question remains whether the
SEC has the authority to accept the proposal, reject it, or require all the
exchanges to adhere to the one share, one vote rule.

rules of the exchanges including a concise general statement of the basis and purpose for the
proposed rule or rule change. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (1981). The SEC then must publish notice
of the proposed rule or rule change together with a description of the proposed rule or rule
change. Id. The SEC must allow all parties interested in the proposed rule or rule change an
opportunity to submit written data, views, and argument concerning the proposed rule change.
Id; see also NYSE Proposal Hearings, supra note 4, at 4-485 (public testimony allowed by
SEC concerning NYSE proposal to eliminate one share, one vote rule).
6. See NYSE Proposal Hearings, supra note 4, at 6-66, 179-485 (testimony from
presidents of NYSE, AMEX and NASD and major individual and institutional investors).
7. See id. at 323 (testimony by SEC commissioner on SEC's authority to impose one
share, one vote on AMEX and NASD); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1981) (statutory authority
for SEC to impose one share, one vote on AMEX and NASD).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2) (1981). The SEC must within 35 to 90 days from the date of
publication of notice approve an exchange proposal for a rule change or institute proceedings
to determine whether to disapprove the rule change. Id. The SEC must conclude within 180
days of the notice date any proceeding that results in disapproval of the proposed rule change.
Id. Upon finding good cause for an extension or the exchange proposing the rule change
consents to the extension, the SEC may extend the disapproval proceedings for up to 60 days.
Id.
The SEC must approve a proposed rule change if it finds that the rule change is consistent
with the requirements of the Securities Exchanges chapter of Title 15 of the United States
Code. Id. The SEC must disapprove a proposed rule change, however, if the rule change is
inconsistent with the Securities Exchange chapter of the Code. Id. In enacting section 19(b)
of the '34 Act, Congress recognized that the SEC's approval of any proposed rule change
would constitute a determination by the SEC that the rule change is within the permitted
purposes and in conformity with the specific standards of the '34 Act. See S. RaP. No. 75,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 28 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NmWs 180,
206; see also Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 667 (1975) (holding that SEC
can compel exchanges to adopt rules when necessary to ensure fair dealing between exchanges
and to protect public shareholders). The United States Supreme Court in Gordon v. NYSE
held that the SEC had explicit statutory authority to review all exchange rules and practices
dealing with the exchange's commission rates. Id. at 685; see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 129 (1973) (discussing SEC's limited authority
prior to 1975 amendments to regulate securities exchanges). The United States Supreme Court
in Merrill Lynch v. Ware held that the initiative and responsibility for promulgating regulations
pertaining to the administration of the securities exchange's ordinary affairs rested with the
exchanges themselves. Id. at 130. The Supreme Court recognized that the congressional aim
of supervised self-regulation was to ensure fair dealing between the exchanges and to protect
investors from harmful or unfair trading practices. Id. The Supreme Court in Merrill Lynch
held that Congress authorized the SEC to step in and compel exchanges to act only when the
exchanges have failed to protect investors adequately. See id. (citing S. REP. No. 792, 73d
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Congress designed the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act)
to protect the investing public trading on the exchanges and to regulate the
securities industry effectively. 9 Thus, Congress granted the SEC broad
powers to combat new schemes designed to defraud the investing public
and manipulate the securities markets. 0 In section 19(b) of the '34 Act
Congress authorized the SEC to alter the rules of the exchanges when
necessary to protect investors, to ensure fair dealing in securities trading,
or to ensure fair administration of exchanges in respect to nine specific
matters." In 1975 Congress amended the '34 Act to broaden the SEC's
powers under section 19(b) by removing the original restrictions that limited
the SEC's powers over the exchanges to specific subject matters. 2 Under

Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934)).
In section 19(c) of the '34 Act, Congress authorized the SEC to abrogate, add to, and
delete from the rules of an exchange as the SEC deems necessary or appropriate to ensure the
fair administration of the securities exchanges. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1981). Under section 19(c),
the SEC must notify the exchange and also publish notice of the proposed rulemaking in the
Federal Register. Id. The SEC must give persons interested in the proposed rule change an
opportunity to offer an oral presentation of data, views, and arguments, in addition to an
opportunity to make written submissions regarding their own views on the proposed rule
change. Id; see NYSE ProposalHearings, supra note 4, at 4-485 (SEC public hearings on
NYSE proposal to eliminate one share, one vote rule); infra notes 15-25, 33-50, 64-69 and
accompanying text (discussing how NYSE proposed rule change could harm investors and
disrupt competition between exchanges).
9. See Sacks v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 593 F.2d 1234, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing S.
REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess, 4 (1934)). The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in Sacks v. Reynolds Securities recognized that Congress anticipated three
modes of securities control to protect the investors: statutory provisions, SEC regulations, and
exchange rules. Id. Congress granted the exchanges with quasi-governmental power and
transformed the exchanges from private trade associations into organizations sharing responsibility for the maintenance of an orderly and fair securities market. Id. In establishing the
tripartite system, Congress contemplated active self-regulation of the securities industry and
the exchanges aggressive promulgation of rules concerning the registered companies. Id; see
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 373 U.S. 341, 351 (1963) (holding that combination
of exchanges growth in power, impact of exchanges in economy, and exchanges inability and
unwillingness to curb abuses that harmed investors moved Congress to enact '34 Act). The
United States Supreme Court in Silver v. NYSE concluded that although by empowering the
SEC to compel exchanges to make changes in their rules and to disapprove any rules adopted
by an exchange, Congress did not grant the SEC jurisdiction to review particular instances of
enforcement of exchange rules. Silver, 373 U.S. at 357; see Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York
Stock Exch., 433 F.2d 264, 273 (7th Cir. 1970) (noting Congress intended '34 Act to protect
investors and that investor protection is SEC's area of expertise). See also PBW Stock Exch.,
Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718, 722 (3d Cir. 1973) (stating that section 19(b) before 1975 amendments
provided procedures for both voluntary and compelled adoption of SEC recommendations in
specified regulatory areas). The Third Circuit in PBW Stock Exch. v. SEC noted that prior
to the 1975 amendments, section 19(b) of the '34 Act empowered the SEC to proceed against
a single exchange by rule, regulation, or order. Id. at 732.
10. PBW Stock Exch., Inc., supra note 9, at 722.
11. See Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 356 n.9 (2d Cir. 1978) (prior to 1975
amendments subsection (3) of section 19(b) allowed SEC to amend exchange rules concerning
listing or striking from listing of any security).
12. Id. at 357.
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the amended section 19(b), only the language "[when] necessary for protection of investors, the maintenance of fair and orderly markets, or the
safeguarding of securities or funds . . . ." circumscribes the SEC's power
to accept or reject the NYSE's proposal or to require all the exchanges to
retain the one share, one vote rule. 3 To approve the NYSE proposed rule

change, the SEC, pursuant to section 19(b), must determine whether the
NYSE proposal is necessary to protect investors and to ensure
fair dealing
4
among the exchanges within the meaning of the '34 Act.'
SEC approval of the NYSE proposed rule change would threaten the
right of shareholders to protect themselves as owners of the corporation

under the concept of corporate democracy by disenfranchising shareholders. 5 The NYSE proposal would allow corporate management to issue a

second class of common stock with either disparate or zero voting rights
upon the approval by both a majority of the corporation's independent
directors and a majority of the corporation's public shareholders eligible to
vote.

6

The proportionate right to vote, however, is fundamental to the idea

13. See id. at 359 (citing S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28, 31 (1975)); see
also 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3)(B) (permissive statutory authority for SEC to approve proposed
rule changes). Congress also included in section 19(b) the mandatory language that requires
the SEC to approve a proposal for a rule change when the proposal is consistent with the
Securities Exchange chapter of Title 15 of the United States Code. Id. § 78s(b)(2). The NYSE
proposed rule change appears to satisfy all the requirements of the Securities Exchange chapter
of the United States Code, therefore, the permissive language of section 19(b) is of primary
relevance to the SEC in deciding whether or not to approve the NYSE proposed rule change.
Id; infra notes 15-25, 33-50, 64-69 and accompanying text (discussing ramifications for investors
if SEC approves NYSE proposal).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3)(B); see supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (discussing
SEC requirements for approving proposed rule change under section 19(b)).
15. See NYSE ProposalHearings, supra note 4, at 349 (worst aspect of disparate voting
stock is disenfranchisement of shareholders); see also infra notes 16-25 and accompanying text
(discussing how NYSE proposed rule change will disenfranchise shareholders).
16. See SEC Request, supra note 3, at 1697 (SEC announcement of NYSE's proposal
to abandon one share, one vote rule). On September 16, 1986, the NYSE directors, pursuant
to section 19(b) of the '34 Act, submitted to the SEC the NYSE's proposed rule change to
eliminate the one share, one vote rule for listing common stock. Id. The NYSE proposal
would allow the management of NYSE registered companies to issue disparate voting stock
after management satisfies certain prerequisites. Id. at 1698.
In June of 1984 the NYSE directors named a Subcommittee on Shareholder Participation
and Qualitative Listing Standards (Subcommittee) to study the public and private sectors'
response to the possibility of eliminating the one share, one vote rule of the NYSE. Brandow,
supra note 3, at 33, col. 3. After collecting information from NYSE registered companies,
academicans, state securities administrators, lawyers, and major institutional investors, the
Subcommittee recommended that, if the registered corporations issuing the disparate voting
stock meet certain requirements, the NYSE should not delist the registered company from the
NYSE for authorizing two classes of common stock one of which has disparate voting rights.
Id. at 47, col. 1.
The NYSE directors revised the Subcommittee's recommendations concerning the necessary
requirements for a registered company of the NYSE to issue disparate voting common stock.
See NYSE Proposal Hearings, supra note 4, at 7 (NYSE proposal provisions). The NYSE
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of corporate democracy. 7 Thus, the NYSE proposal is an abrogation of
the exchange's responsibility to preserve equality in voting which is the
essence of corporate democracy." The threat of the proposed rule change
to corporate democracy suggests that retention of the one share, one vote
rule is necessary to protect shareholders and that, consequently, the SEC
has no power under section 19(b) to accept the NYSE proposal.' 9
The NYSE proposal would result in the elimination of corporate democracy by disenfranchising future shareholders of the second class of
common stock as well as the current shareholders of the second class. 20 The
NYSE directors declined to incorporate into the NYSE proposal a sunset
clause that would protect the interests of future shareholders of the second
class of common stock.2' The sunset clause would have required the shareholders of the second class of common stock to reconsider periodically
22
whether that stock should continue to retain the superior voting power.
The sunset clause would have allowed the shareholders of a corporation
issuing a second class of common stock to regain the voting rights that the
previous shareholders forfeited. 23 Thus, the NYSE proposal eliminates the

proposal, submitted to the SEC, requires any corporate management of a NYSE registered
company attempting to issue disparate voting common stock to acquire the approval from
both a majority of the independent directors of the company and a majority of the registered
company's public shareholders eligible to vote not just a majority of the shares actually voted
before issuing the new class or series of common stock. Id. The proposal does not allow
corporate officers, directors, members of immediate families of the officers and directors, or
the affiliates of the officers and directors, or affiliates of the issuing company to vote in
approving the new class or series of common stock. Id. The proposal provides that NYSE
registered companies currently issuing disparate voting common stock, but failing to obtain
the necessary approvals from a majority of the independent directors and the public shareholders, would have two years in which to comply with the approval provisions. Id. at 8. The
NYSE proposal does not, however, require majority approval from the public shareholders or
the independent directors if the disparate voting stock existed when the company went public
or if management distributed the stock pro rata to the common shareholders in a transaction
in which the management was not the issuer of the disparate voting stock. See SEC Request,
supra note 3, at 1698 (describing NYSE proposal provisions).
17. NYSE ProposalHearings,supra note 4, at 290. During the NYSE proposal hearings,
critics of the NYSE proposed rule change testified that the rule change would undermine one
of the keystones of corporate democracy by disenfranchising shareholders and reducing the
ability of public investors to protect themselves. Id. at 409.
18. See id. at 257 (voting power is basic to shareholder's rights and SEC should force
NYSE to maintain its responsibility to shareholders to preserve corporate democracy).
19. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's duty under section
19(b) to approve proposed rule changes that are necessary to protect investors).
20. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (approval of NYSE proposal will
disenfranchise shareholders); see also infra note 21 and accompanying text (noting provisions
of NYSE proposal do not include sunset clause).
21. See NYSE Proposal Hearings, supra note 4, at 35 (little support from NYSE
constituents or directors for implementing sunset provision in NYSE proposal).
22. Id; see Brandow, supra note 3, at 47, col. 4 (sunset clause places limited life concept
on common stock with disparate voting rights).
23. See NYSE ProposalHearings, supra note 4, at 8 (sunset provision would require
shareholders of disparate voting stock to confirm continuation of different voting rights at
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exchange's responsibility to preserve equality in voting among both the
24

current and the future shareholders of the second class of common stock.

The possibility that the NYSE proposal would eliminate the concept of

corporate democracy suggests that the one share, one vote rule is necessary
to protect the shareholders and that, consequently, the SEC has no power

under section 19(b) to approve the NYSE proposal.Y
The NYSE directors reason that the fundamental basis for allowing

management to disenfranchise the shareholders of the second class of
common stock is that the shareholders are protected from the corporate

management issuing the second class only for the benefit of themselves
because the management must receive approval from two public sources
within the corporation. 26 The NYSE directors claim that the checks and
balance system under the proposal requiring management to obtain approval
from a majority of the independent directors and the shareholders eligible
to vote is sufficient to protect the investors from the management issuing
a second class of common stock that reduces the shareholder's rights in the
corporation. 27 The concepts of shareholder approval and independent director approval, however, possibly are inadequate safeguards to protect the
investors.2 1 In controlling the proxy system that solicits the shareholders'

votes on the issue of creating a disparate voting stock, management may
influence shareholder approval by offering to the shareholders incentives to
29
approve the disparate voting stock such as higher dividends and bonuses.
specific intervals); see also Brandow, supra note 3, at 47, col. 4 (explaining that sunset
provision would allow regular common shareholders to eliminate super vote whenever regular
common shareholders did not approve continuation of disparate voting stock).
24. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing NYSE's reluctance to
include sunset provision in proposal).
25. See supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text (relating how NYSE proposed rule
change eliminates concept of corporate democracy and disenfranchises shareholders). See also
supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (discussing SEC power to approve NYSE proposal
if it is necessary to protect investors).
26. See NYSE Proposal Hearings, supra note 4, at 22 (noting NYSE's rationale for
allowing shareholders to disenfranchise themselves); see also supra note 16 and accompanying
text (discussing NYSE proposal provisions requiring majority approval from both issuing
corporation's independent directors and public shareholders).
27. See NYSE Proposal Hearings, supra note 4, at 25 (checks and balance system of
NYSE proposal serves corporations as well as United States government by allowing shareholders to use voting power to correct actions of management). The NYSE directors testified
before the SEC during the proposal hearings that the NYSE did not have the right to override
the shareholders' decision to disenfranchise themselves. Id. at 32. The NYSE directors maintained that the approval requirements for the NYSE proposal still exceeded the state law listing
standards for securities as well as the listing standards of both the AMEX and the NASD.
Id. at 11; see supra note 16 and accompanying text (outlining NYSE proposal provisions).
28. NYSE ProposalHearings, supra note 4, at 93.
29. Id. at 99. Critics of the NYSE proposal testified during the SEC proposal hearings
that corporate management can influence a shareholder's decision to approve disparate voting
stock with monetary incentives and other techniques that may lead to collective action problems.
Id. Other critics of the proposed rule change claimed that often management may provide the
shareholders with higher dividend payouts than management normally would have provided
had management retained the limited voting stock. Id. at 137.
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Many shareholders also have so much confidence and trust in the management of their respective corporations that they will concede to any sugges-

tions that the management proposes, including whether or not to issue
disparate voting stock.

0

Whether independent directors truly act independ-

ently of the corporate management is also questionable, because an independent director's salary depends on the approval of the chairman of the
board of the company seeking to issue the disparate voting stock.'

The

argument that disenfranchisement of the investors is valid because a majority
of both the shareholders and the independent directors approve the disparate

voting stock, therefore, is insufficient to allow management to eliminate the
concept of corporate democracy by disenfranchising the investors.32
Approval of the NYSE proposal would undermine the concept of
corporate democracy even further by entrenching the management from any
accountability to the shareholders.3 3 The NYSE proposal would enable
corporate management to reduce the amount of leverage the shareholders

could exert on the management by controlling a majority voting position
through the disparate voting stock.3 4 Shareholders rely on the voting process
to protect their investment.3 5 Shareholders resort to the voting process to
remove current management when the management's performance is unsatisfactory.3 6 The shareholder's right to vote on the management of the
corporation is also one of the best incentives for management to succeed

in achieving the maximum return on the shareholder's investment. 37 By
limiting the significance of the shareholder's vote, corporate management

would reduce the ability of the shareholders to oversee management and to
protect their investment.3 " The argument is plausible that without strong

30. Id. at 164.
31. Id. at 372.
32. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text (discussing how majority votes from
shareholders and independent directors fail to protect investors from corporate management
adequately).
33. NYSE ProposalHearings, supra note 4, at 349. Opponents of the NYSE proposal
pleaded with the SEC during the proposal hearings that approval of the proposal would make
it virtually impossible for shareholders to exert pressure on the corporate management to take
any specific action, no matter how poor the management's performance. Id. Critics of the
NYSE proposal testified that approval of the proposal would allow the management issuing
the disparate voting stock to remain in control of the corporation's management irrespective
of the management's efficiency and shareholder interest. Id. at 103.
34. Id. at 347.
35. Id. at 321.
36. Id. at 322.
37. Id. at 178. Critics of the NYSE proposal testified during the NYSE proposal hearings
that if the SEC approves the NYSE proposal, corporate managements may initiate activities
that benefit only the management. Id.
38. Id. at 263. Opponents of the NYSE proposal claim that to limit a shareholder's
vote is to render his ownership interest in the corporation worthless and reduces his ability to
oversee the management. Id. Opponents also claim that some independence from management
is essential, because if management retains a majority of the corporation's voting power, then
management controls the elections of the corporation's directors as well. Id. at 265.
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corporate accountability to shareholders as owners of the corporation, the

continued existence of corporations as entities owned by shareholders may
39

cease.
By using disparate voting stock, management could entrench itself from

shareholder accountability and also entrench itself from the competition for

control that takeovers create. 40 Management could secure a majority voting

position by issuing disparate voting stock, which would make takeovers

virtually impossible. 4' In preventing takeovers, management eliminates the

investor's ability to receive a higher monetary return on his investment from
a more efficient management acquiring control of the corporation. 42 The
entrenchment of management from takeovers also reduces, if not eliminates,
the possibility that an outside corporation through a tender offer would
offer the shareholder a higher monetary return on the stock than the
shareholder could anticipate from retaining the investment.4 3 The NYSE
proposal would allow corporate management the necessary security, free
from hostile takeovers, to develop and to execute long range decisions and

allow the management to sell the corporation on a negotiated basis if so
desired.4 Arguably, it is unfair to deny shareholders the right to decide
who would represent their long term interests 45 Unchecked mismanagement
sometimes is the reason for takeovers, and leaving management less accountable not only to the shareholders, but also to outside corporations,

39. Id. at 277. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text (discussing how NYSE
proposal entrenches management from accountability to shareholders).
40. See Dent, Dual Class Capitalization:A Reply to ProfessorSeligman, 54 Gao. WAsH.
L, REv. 725, 745 (1986) (dual class capitalization harms shareholders by eliminating potential
hostile takeovers); see also NYSE ProposalHearings, supra note 4, at 163 (claiming NYSE
proposal designed to stop hostile takeovers).
41. Dent, supra note 40, at 745; see also NYSE ProposalHearings, supra note 4, at 101
(noting that approval of NYSE proposal would create de facto poison pill allowing management
to prevent any unwanted takeover attempt). Opponents of the NYSE proposal claim that the
threat of hostile takeovers has led corporate America to develop the disparate voting stock as
an ultimate defensive tactic to thwart hostile takeovers. NYSE ProposalHearings, supra note
4, at 411.
42. See Dent, supra note 40, at 745 (dual class capitalization reduces threat that
takeovers exert on management). Professor Dent in Dual Class Capitalization:A Reply to
Professor Seligman claims that by granting the management extra votes, shareholders can
render a hostile takeover mathmatically impossible. Id. Professor Dent also claims that because
the management would control a majority voting position through the use of the disparate
voting stock a hostile takeover could be prohubitively expensive. Id.
43. Id. In Dual Class Capitalization Dent notes that even if a takeover occurs, the
management subject to the takeover can use their superior voting position resulting from the
disparate voting stock to retain for themselves much of the profit resulting from the tender
offer. Id.
44. NYSE ProposalHearings,supra note 4, at 344.
45. Id. Proponents of the NYSE proposal testified before the SEC that the proposal
would allow shareholders with long term interests in the corporation to provide management
with the ability to make and to execute long range strategic decisions. Id. The proposal also
negates the negative influence that speculative investors with short term objectives might
otherwise have on the corporation. Id.
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could compound the mismanagement. 46 Disenfranchising shareholders and
entrenching management, therefore, possibly are the worst side-effects to
thwarting attempted takeovers. 47 In reality, the NYSE proposal could allow
corporate management the opportunity to entrench themselves against shareholder accountability, and also could eliminate the investor's opportunity

to realize a higher monetary return on his investment resulting from a
tender offer. 4 Because the NYSE proposal disenfranchises both the current
and the future shareholders and the proposal entrenches the corporate

management, the proposal would fail to protect investors and their respective
investments. 49 The possibility of disenfranchisement of shareholders and the

entrenchment of corporate management suggests that retention of the one
share, one vote rule is necessary to protect shareholders and that, conse-

quently, the SEC has no power under section 19(b) to accept the NYSE
proposal.50
Retention of the one share, one vote rule is also necessary to ensure

fair dealing and competition among the exchanges.51 Congress structured
the 1975 Amendments to the '34 Act to authorize the SEC to eliminate all
unnecessary restraints on competition among the exchanges. 52 Congress
determined that it was essential to grant the SEC broad discretionary powers
to regulate the development of a national market system that would encompass all segments of the corporate securities markets. 53 In regulating the
national market system, Congress specifically authorized the SEC to eliminate all practices or rules impeding competition among the exchanges unless

46. Id. at 283.
47. Id.
48. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text (discussing how NYSE proposal will
eliminate management accountability from takeovers).
49. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (describing SEC's authority under
section 19(b) to approve proposed rule changes that are necessary to protect investors).
50. See supra notes 15-25, 33-49 and accompanying text (discussing how NYSE proposal
harms investors by disenfranchising shareholders and entrenching management); see also supra
notes 13-14 and accompanying text (outlining SEC's authority to approve exchange rule changes
when necessary to protect investors).
51. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (congressional intent to authorize SEC
to maintain fair competitive attitude between exchanges); see also supra notes 13-14 and
accompanying text (Congress authorized SEC to adopt rules that ensure fair dealing between
securities exchanges).
52. See S. REP. No. 75, supra note 8, at 2, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG;. &
ADum-z. Naws 181 (Congress intended SEC to pursue goal of centralizing trading of securities).
In adopting Senate bill number 249, 1975 amemdment to section 19(b) of the '34 Act, Congress
acknowledged that self-regulation of exchanges would continue to exist between the exchange.
Congress, however, noted that the SEC would perform a much larger role in regulating the
exchanges than before, to ensure that no gap existed between self-regulatory performance and
regulatory need. Id. Congress also intended that, when appropriate, the SEC would provide
leadership for the development of a more coherent and rational regulatory structure to
correspond to and effectively police the national market system. Id.
53. Id. at 7, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AniNM. NEws 185. Congress noted
that the Senate bill did not purport to force all markets for securities into a single mold. Id.
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they serve a valid regulatory purpose.5 4 Congress' objective was to enhance
competition and to allow economic forces, interacting within fair regulatory
confines, to develop appropriate variations in exchange practices.55 Congress
recognized, however, that it was contrary to the purpose of encouraging
competition among the exchanges to compel the exchanges to eliminate
6

differences between the exchanges that were competition-enhancing.

In line with the purpose of Congress' intent to uphold competition-

enhancing differences among the exchanges, the NYSE directors claim that
the proposed rule change is necessary for the NYSE to compete effectively

with the AMEX and the NASD. 5 7 The directors of the NYSE argue that
adoption of the proposed rule change is necessary to give the registered
companies of the NYSE the flexibility in raising additional capital that the
AMEX and the NASD allow their respective registered companies issuing

common stock with disparate voting rights."' The NASD has no specific
rules restricting companies that desire to issue common stock with disparate
voting rights.5 9 The AMEX restricts only the listing of a nonvoting common

54. Id. at 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD?IN. NEWS 186.
55. Id. Congress in the 1975 amendments to the '34 Act noted that since 1936 a major
responsibility of the SEC in the administration of the securities laws was to "create a fair
field of competition" between the exchanges. Id.
56. Id. Congress commented that Senate bill number 249 would identify more clearly
the SEC's responsibility to enhance competition and also would clarify and strengthen the
SEC's authority to carry out its responsibility. Id; see supra notes 52-55 and accompanying
text (discussing Congress' intent to enlarge SEC's scope of authority to regulate exchanges).
57. See NYSE Proposal Hearings, supra note 4 and accompanying text (noting that
although supporting one share, one vote rule, NYSE directors fear that rule impedes NYSE's
ability to compete effectively with AMEX and NASD).
58. See supra note 4, at 9 (noting that NYSE's CEO testified that NYSE registered
companies need flexibility in choosing capital structures and methods for raising money). The
CEO of the NYSE testified during the NYSE proposal hearings that in response to the recent
proliferation of tender offers and the use of new types of equity to effect acquisitions,
shareholders of some of the NYSE registered companies have approved the disparate voting
stock to increase their respective company's flexibility in creating a capital structure that will
not subject the company to potential takeovers. Id. Professor Daniel Fischel in Organized
Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock explains how dual class capitalization allows corporate management to retain control of the company without holding 51%
of the company's outstanding equity. D. FISCHEL, ORGANIZED ExcHANOEs AND THE REGULATION
OF DUAL CLASS COMMON STOCK 21-22 (1986) [hereinafter FIsCHEL, Organized Exchanges].
Professor Fischel notes in his article that dual class capitalization allows the corporation to
create a capital structure that relies on outside equity. Id. Professor Fischel claims that
corporations that use more outside equity are able to pursue investment opportunities that
have higher expected returns than alternative uses of capital regardless of the management's
personal wealth. Id. Professor Fischel also claims that a capital structure based on dual class
capitalization allows the management to diversify risk more efficently through the use of
outside investors. Id. Professor Fischel concludes that dual class capitalization allows management to obtain the benefits of outside equity financing while still retaining control over the
firm. Id. See supra note 3 (discussing threat of NYSE registered companies to leave NYSE);
note 2 and accompanying text (outlining AMEX and NASD requirements on issuing disparate
voting stock).
59. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (outlining absence of NASD requirements
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stock and permits the listing of a common stock that has the right to elect
only a minority of the board of directors.60 Companies registered with the
AMEX and the NASD, therefore, are in a more favorable position than
companies registered on the NYSE because those companies registered on
the AMEX and the NASD may issue disparate voting stock to raise new
capital without sacrificing management's control of the corporation. 6 The
NYSE directors argue that the exchange's adherence to the one share, one
vote rule restricts companies registered on the NYSE from creating a
desirable capital structure, unlike the AMEX or the NASD. 62 The main
reason for the NYSE proposal, therefore, is that with the option to issue
disparate voting stock the NYSE registered companies can raise new capital
without sacrificing control of the corporation and, thereby, can compete
63
more effectively with companies registered on the AMEX and the NASD.
Although elimination of the one share, one vote rule by the SEC would
permit the NYSE to compete more effectively with the AMEX and the
NASD, SEC approval of the proposal may start a "race to the bottom"
between the exchanges. 4 The directors of the AMEX have announced that

on issuing disparate voting stock). The chairman of the NASD testified during the NYSE
proposal hearings that although the NASD does not require that its companies maintain a one
share, one vote rule, ninety-five percent of the NASD companies maintain the one share, one
vote structure. NYSE Proposal Hearings,supra note 4, at 61.
60. AMEX Guide, supra note 2, § 122, reprinted in 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) §
10,022, at 3525 (1985). But cf. Ingersoll & Swartz, AMEX Head Warns of Regulatory 'Excess'
if Big Board Drops Voting Rule on Stock, Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1986, at 5, col. I (claiming
AMEX allows its registered companies to issue one class of common stock that has ten votes
per share).
61. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing how disparate voting stock
allows management to raise additional capital by using outside equity without losing control
of company).
62. See NYSE ProposalHearings,supra note 4, at 9 (NYSE's argument for rule change
is that corporate America needs flexibility in choosing desirable capital structure).
63. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text (discussing NYSE's claim that by
eliminating one share, one vote rule NYSE's registered companies could create flexible capital
structure).
64. See SEC ChairmanShad FloatsCompromise on NYSE Dual ClassificationProposal,
[July-Dec.] SEc. REG. & L. RaP. (BNA) 1805, 1806 (Dec. 19, 1986) [hereinafter SEC Chairman
Shad] (discussing possible "race to bottom" between exchanges if SEC approves NYSE
disparate voting rights proposal). But see FISCHEL, Organized Exchanges, supra note 58, at
10-17 (disputing possibility that disparate voting stock will create "race to bottom"). Professor
Fischel in OrganizedExchanges claims that the "race to the bottom" concept contains at least
three related misconceptions: that corporate managers prefer exchange rules that allow them
to exploit investors; that it is in the interests of the exchanges to adopt rules that exploit
investors; and, that the absence of regulation is necessarily evidence of a pro-management,
anti-investor bias. Id. at 11. Fischel argues that the logical fallacy in the "race to the bottom"
concept is that it assumes that managers will seek exchanges that facilitate the exploitation of
investors. Id. at 12. Fischel explains that the empirical evidence suggests that investors do not
perceive a great deal of difference between investing in a company listed on the NASD and a
company listed on the NYSE. Id. at 14. Fischel claims that proponents of the "race to the
bottom" concept assume that the NYSE is a haven for stockholder protection rules, and that
the other exchanges are the "bottom" because they do not have these protection rules. Id. at
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if the SEC approves the NYSE proposal, the AMEX would request that

the SEC permit the AMEX to remove all the current stock issuing restrictions
on AMEX registered companies that issue disparate voting common stock. 65
The NASD currently has no restrictions on its registered companies issuing
disparate voting common stock and, therefore, does not perceive any
potential "race to the bottom" .16 Because of the AMEX threat, however,
SEC approval of the proposal would create an unnecessary burden on

competition between the exchanges attempting to offer the most liberal
restrictions for issuing disparate voting common stock.6 7 Contrary to Congress' intentions under section 19(b) of the '34 Act, SEC approval of the
proposal would eliminate the competition-enhancing element between the
NYSE, the AMEX, and the NASD that the one share, one vote rule

establishes in favor of a more damaging form of competition between the

exchanges in the form of a potential "race to the bottom". 68 The SEC,
therefore, does not possess the authority necessary to approve the NYSE
proposal. 69
Because SEC approval of the NYSE proposed rule change could reduce
investor protection and could diminish the fair dealing between the securities
exchanges, the SEC may decide to impose the one share, one vote rule on
the AMEX and the NASD. 7 0 Section 19(c) of the '34 Act authorizes the
SEC to add to the rules of the exchanges when the SEC "deems necessary
or appropriate to ensure the fair administration of the exchanges". 7' Con16. Fischel explains that if this were true, it is logical that the rational investors would pay
significantly more for a stock that listed on the NYSE. Id. Fischel claims that the existing
evidence does not support the proposition that the other exchanges are the "bottom". Id.
Fischel concludes that the concern that allowing exchanges to compete by adopting voting
rules that are pro-management to attract corporations may lead to a race among all exchanges
is completely without foundation. Id.
65. NYSE Proposal Hearings, supra note 4, at 57-58; see SEC Chairman Shad, supra
note 64, at 1806 (approval of NYSE proposal will force AMEX to reduce its listing standards
for disparate voting stock).
66. See SEC Chairman Shad, supra note 64, at 1806 (NASD claims that no evidence
exists that liberalized listing standards harm shareholder interests).
67. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent to broaden
SEC authority to allow SEC to eliminate unnecessary burdens on exchange competition); see
also supra note 65 and accompanying text (describing AMEX threat to eliminate all existing
stock restrictions for its registered companies listing disparate voting stock).
68. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text (discussing how possible "race to
bottom" between exchanges would impose unnecessary burden on competition); see also supra
notes 52-56 and accompanying text (outlining Congress' intentions to enhance competition in
securities exchange market).
69. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's authority under
section 19(b) to enhance competition among exchanges).
70. See supra notes 15-25, 33-50, 64-69 and accompanying text (discussing ramifications
on investor protection and fair dealing among exchanges if SEC approves NYSE proposed
rule change); see also infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (evaluating SEC authority
under section 19(c) to impose one share, one vote rule on AMEX and NASD).
71. Association of Inv. Brokers v. SEC, 676 F.2d 857, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see supra
note 9 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent in enacting section 19(c)); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78s(c) (1981) (section 19(c) of '34 Act).
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gress enacted section 19(c) to empower the SEC to amend the rules of the
exchanges in any manner to further the purposes of the '34 Act. 72 Congress,
however, restricts the SEC's authority under section 19(c) to evaluate its
own regulatory proposals in light of the fundamental national economic
policy of furthering competition and prohibits the SEC from promulgating

any rule that imposes a burden on competition unnecessary or inappropriate
to achieve the purposes of the '34 Act.73
Disapproval of the NYSE proposed rule change by the SEC alone,

however, will not remedy the currently disadvantageous position of the
NYSE in competing with the AMEX and the NASD for the registration of
corporations. 74 Although the NYSE directors claim that the proposed rule
change is necessary for the NYSE registered companies to compete effectively

with the AMEX and the NASD, the SEC should recognize that the NYSE
proposal could create a situation that hinders the competitive atmosphere

among the exchanges more than the competition that the one share, one
vote rule creates through a potential "race to the bottom". 75 Because the
AMEX and the NASD currently have less stringent stock issuing restrictions,
it is necessary and appropriate for the SEC to use its authority under
section 19(c) to impose the one share, one vote rule on both the AMEX
and the NASD to ensure the fair administration of the exchanges.7 6 The
one share, one vote rule would not, however, impose an unnecessary burden

on competition because all three exchanges would have to incorporate the
rule. 77 On the contrary, if the SEC permits the NYSE to eliminate the one
share, one vote rule, the competition among the exchanges for the registration of corporations would acclerate in the form of a potential "race to
the bottom" .7 The SEC, therefore, should exercise its authority pursuant

72. S. R P. No. 75, supra note 8, at 131, reprintedin 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 308. Section 19(c) of the '34 Act empowers the SEC to abrogate, add to, and delete
from the rules of an exchange when the SEC deems it necessary or appropriate to ensure the
fair administration of the exchange. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1981).
73. H. R. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 91, 94, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmmN. Naws 321, 325. Congress stated that the SEC's responsibility under Senate
bill number 257, the 1975 amendment to section 19(c) of the '34 Act, was to balance the
perceived anticompetitive effects of a regulatory policy or decision against the purposes of the
'34 Act. Id.
74. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text (NYSE's competitively disadvantagous
position among securities exchanges because of one share, one vote rule).
75. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text (discussing potential "race to bottom"
if SEC approves NYSE proposal); see also supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text (explaining
that Congress empowered SEC to enhance competition between securities exchanges).
76. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing AMEX and NASD requirements
on issuing common stock); notes 71-73 and accompanying text (outlining SEC's authority
under section 19(c) of '34 Act to adopt exchange rules that ensure fair administration between
exchanges).
77. See generally supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's authority
under section 19(c) of '34 Act to require all exchanges to adhere to one share, one vote rule).
78. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text (describing how SEC approval of
NYSE's proposal could result in "race to bottom" between exchanges).
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to section 19(c) to impose the one share, one vote rule on both the AMEX
and the NASD and, thereby, ensure fair competition between the exchanges. 79
In enacting the '34 Act, Congress authorized the SEC to protect public
shareholders and to ensure fair competition between the exchanges in any
manner the SEC deemed necessary." In 1975 Congress enlarged the powers
of the SEC by granting the SEC the authority necessary to impose rules on
the securities exchanges when the exchanges failed to protect investors
81
adequately and failed to maintain fair competition between themselves.

The NYSE proposal to eliminate the one share, one vote requirement for
NYSE registered corporations issuing common stock with disparate voting
rights will harm investors by disenfranchising the shareholders.

2

Because

the NYSE proposal harms investors by eliminating the shareholders' right
to a proportionate vote equal to the shareholders' ownership interest in the

corporation, the SEC has no power to approve the proposal. 3 The proposal
would permit corporate managements issuing the disparate voting stock to
eliminate management accountability to shareholders and will reduce the
degree of management accountability for corporate control that hostile
takeovers create.84 The NYSE proposal also will disrupt the competitive
element that the NYSE one share, one vote rule creates and may start a
"race to the bottom".-' The NYSE proposal, therefore, is unnecessary to
protect investors and to ensure fair dealing among the exchanges. 6 Indeed,
the NYSE proposal harms investors and may create a competitively disruptive "race to the bottom" among the exchanges. 87 Pursuant to its authority

79. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent in enacting
section 19(c) to enable SEC to ensure fair dealing between securities exchanges).
80. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent in enacting
section 19(b) of '34 Act).
81. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (evaluating 1975 Amendments to
section 19(b) of '34 Act).
82. See supra notes 15-25 and accompanying text (noting that NYSE proposal will
eliminate essence of corporate democracy because disparate voting stock disenfranchises shareholders).
83. See supra notes 15-25 and accompanying text (discussing how NYSE proposal would
disenfranchise shareholders); see also supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (outlining SEC's
authority under section 19(b) of '34 Act to approve exchange rules that are necessary to
protect investors).
84. See supra notes 33-50 and accompanying text (discussing how management may
limit both their accountability to shareholders and to corporate control from takeovers by
issuing disparate voting stock).
85. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text (discussing possible "race to bottom"
if SEC approves NYSE proposal).
86. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's authority under
section 19(b) of '34 Act to approve only proposed rule changes when necessary to protect
investors or to ensure fair dealing among exchanges).
87. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (noting Congress' intent to authorize
SEC to regulate competition between exchanges).
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under section 19(b) of the '34 Act, therefore, the SEC should disapprove
the NYSE proposal to abandon the one share, one vote rule." The SEC

should recognize, however, the competitive disadvantage that the one share,
one vote rule places on the NYSE in competing with the AMEX and the
NASD for the registration of corporations.8 9 Therefore, under its authority
in section 19(c) of the '34 Act to impose regulatory rules on the exchanges

to maintain a favorably competitive atmosphere, the SEC should impose
the one share, one vote rule on both the AMEX and the NASD.90
ROBERT MUTH

88. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's authority under
section 19(b)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3)(B) (1981) (codifying section 19(b) of '34 Act).
89. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text (discussing NYSE's competitive
disadvantage among other exchanges if SEC requires NYSE to maintain one share, one vote
rule).
90. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (discussing SEC's authority under
section 19(c) of '34 Act); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1981) (section 19(c) of '34 Act).

